William Webb, Jr. v. Brian Chapman by unknown
2021 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-14-2021 
William Webb, Jr. v. Brian Chapman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021 
Recommended Citation 
"William Webb, Jr. v. Brian Chapman" (2021). 2021 Decisions. 594. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021/594 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 




DLD-203        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






WILLIAM JOSEPH WEBB, JR., 




BRIAN J. CHAPMAN; LAW OFFICES OF BRIAN J. CHAPMAN 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-00270) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard G. Andrews 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 17, 2021 
Before:  JORDAN, KRAUSE and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges 
 







* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 William J. Webb, Jr., a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, 
appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint and denying his motions 
to amend the complaint, to disqualify counsel, for appointment of counsel, for default 
judgment, and for injunctive relief.  For the reasons described below, we will summarily 
affirm. 
I.  
In December 2019, Webb filed a complaint in state court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 and the Delaware Constitution1 against Brian J. Chapman, an attorney who 
apparently represented Webb in criminal proceedings, and the Law Offices of Brian 
Chapman. Webb alleged that the defendants violated his rights to effective assistance of 
counsel and to a fair trial by, inter alia, sharing information with the Deputy Attorney 
General that was used to secure an indictment against Webb and failing to secure his 
release when he was falsely arrested, imprisoned, and maliciously prosecuted. 
The defendants removed the matter to the United States District Court for the 
District of Delaware and later moved to dismiss.  Webb moved to strike the motion to 
dismiss, to disqualify defense counsel, to amend his complaint, and for appointment of 
counsel, default judgment, and injunctive relief.  The District Court granted the motion to 
 
1 Webb also pointed to Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8106, as providing a basis for his 
lawsuit; however, that provision merely describes the statute of limitations applicable to 
various categories of civil actions. 
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dismiss, denied Webb’s motion to amend, and denied Webb’s remaining motions as 
moot.  Webb timely appealed. 
 
II.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the District Court’s 
grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo.  See Newark Cab Ass’n v. City 
of Newark, 901 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2018).  To survive dismissal, a complaint must set 
out “sufficient factual matter” to show that its claims are facially plausible.  See Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  We accept all factual allegations in the complaint as 
true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Fleisher v. Standard 
Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012), and we construe Webb’s pro se complaint 
liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).  We may 
summarily affirm “on any basis supported by the record” if the appeal fails to present a 
substantial question.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
III.  
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must . . . show that the alleged 
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”  West v. Atkins, 
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).  As the District Court recognized, attorneys representing 
individuals in criminal proceedings generally are not state actors for purposes of § 1983.  
See, e.g., Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (holding that “a public 
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defender does not act under color of state law when” acting as “counsel to a defendant in 
a criminal proceeding”); Black v. Bayer, 672 F.2d 309, 314 (3d Cir. 1982), abrogated on 
other grounds by D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1368 
n.7 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that “no color of state law attache[s] to the functions of court-
appointed counsel”); Steward v. Meeker, 459 F.2d 669, 670 (3d Cir. 1972) (per curiam) 
(finding privately retained defense counsel is not a state actor).  The District Court thus 
properly dismissed Webb’s § 1983 claims because Chapman and his law office are 
private—not state—actors. 
Although defense attorneys may act “under color of” state law when they conspire 
with state officials to deprive a person of his or her federal rights, see Tower v. Glover, 
467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984), a plaintiff pleading unconstitutional conspiracy “must assert 
facts from which a conspiratorial agreement can be inferred,” Great W. Mining & Min. 
Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 178 (3d Cir. 2010).  Webb’s bare assertion that 
Chapman provided the Deputy Attorney General with privileged information failed to 
plausibly allege any conspiracy, and the conclusory allegations in his proposed amended 
complaint and other filings in the District Court fared no better.  Under these 
circumstances, the District Court did not err in finding amendment would be futile.  See 
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).2  
 
2 Having dismissed Webb’s complaint, the District Court properly denied Webb’s 




Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.3 
 
3 In light of our disposition, Webb’s motion for remand with jurisdiction retained is 
denied.  We have considered the arguments raised in that motion and conclude they are 
without merit and therefore do not warrant further discussion. 
